©2019 by Brett Green

PUBLICATIONS

American Economic Review, 2020  (with Brendan Daley)

We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller’s type from “news.” We find that the buyer’s ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from the seller is remarkably limited. [Slides] [Working Paper]

Journal of Finance, 2020 (with Brendan Daley and Victoria Vanasco)

Credit ratings jointly affect bank's incentive to retain loans as well as their incentive to originate good loans and shift the economy toward an originate-to-distribute equilibrium. [Slides] [Working Paper]

American Economic Review, 2019 (with Vladimir Asriyan and William Fuchs)

We develop a rational theory of self-fulfilling sentiments based on the interaction between adverse selection and resale considerations. [Slides] [Working Paper]

Management Science, 2018 (with Jeff Zwiebel)

We find strong evidence of a hot hand in major league baseball. Our results are in notable contrast to the majority of the hot-hand literature. We argue that this difference is attributable to endogenous defensive responses. [Slides] [Working Paper]

Media Coverage: NY Times, Washington Post, Boston Globe, ESPN, Priceonomics, Quartz

American Economic Review, 2017 (with Vladimir Asriyan and William Fuchs)

Information spillovers generate multiple equilibria when asset values are sufficiently correlated. Improving transparency of trading behavior changes its information content. [Slides] [Working Paper]

American Economic Review, 2016 (with Curtis Taylor)

Self-reported progress can be used to improve economic outcomes. The optimal contract involves both deterministic and stochastic deadlines. [Slides] [Working Paper] [Online Appendix]

Journal of Finance, 2016 (with Brendan Daley)

Liquidity varies over time due to asymmetric information and fluctuations in trader's beliefs about asset values.  [Slides] [Working Paper] [Online Appendix]

Journal of Financial Economics, 2016 (with William Fuchs and Dimitris Papanikolaou)

In a dynamic, general equilibrium model, adverse selection leads to delays in firms’ divestment decisions and thus slow recoveries from shocks, even when these shocks do not affect the economy’s potential output. [Slides] [Working Paper]

Journal of Financial Economics, 2015 (with Snehal Banerjee)

Uncertainty about whether other traders are informed leads to a non-linear price that reacts asymmetrically to news. Novel dynamics emerge when traders learn about others over time. The model nests both rational expectations (RE) and differences of opinions (DO) models, but generates predictions that obtain in neither.  [Slides] [Working Paper]

Journal of Economic Theory, 2014 (with Brendan Daley)

Public information about the sender fundamentally changes the prediction of classic signaling models. The equilibrium depends on the prior and resolves a long-standing paradox within the signaling literature. [Slides] [Working Paper] [Online Appendix]

Econometrica, 2012 (with Brendan Daley)

News leads to periods of trade breakdown in dynamic markets with asymmetric information. The model nests Akerlof and Spence. With news, the equilibria of the two models looks identical. [Slides] [Working Paper] [Online Appendix]