Professor of Finance | Olin Business School | Washington University in St. Louis

Working Papers

with Cyrus Mevorach and Curtis Taylor
R&R at The Review of Economic Studies
Abstract
We study consumer stockpiling, monopoly pricing, and inventory choice during supply disruptions. Consumer stockpiling may reduce firm profits and consumer welfare. We show that strategic reserves can restore optimality by mitigating the distortions caused by supply uncertainty. [SSRN] [Slides]
with Paul Gertler, Renping Li, and David Sraer
R&R at The Review of Economic Studies
Abstract
We study PAYGo financing for smartphones and other consumer durables in developing countries. Using a dynamic structural model estimated from a fintech pricing experiment, we show that technology-enabled lending generates significant welfare gains equivalent to a substantial income increase, while remaining profitable for lenders. [SSRN] [Slides]
with Alexander S. Gorbenko and Shreye Mirani
Abstract
We study non-price deal terms in merger contests. Using a hand-collected dataset of U.S. mergers, we show that non-price terms are pervasive, differ systematically by bidder type, and often determine the winner. Our structural model reveals that these terms carry substantial economic value for targets. [Draft]
with Felix Z. Feng, Curtis R. Taylor, and Mark Westerfield
Abstract
We study the optimal organizational structure for innovation over time, analyzing complementary R&D tasks with moral hazard and privately observed discovery quality. We characterize when a solo innovator is optimal versus a team structure and how the optimal allocation shifts over the project lifecycle. [Draft]
with Paul Gertler and Catherine Wolfram
Abstract
Using a field experiment with a digital lender, we show that requiring a temporary, fully refunded cash deposit prior to loan disbursement screens borrowers on dimensions of quality not captured by the lender's credit scoring model. The deposit reduces take-up but substantially improves repayment and profitability, demonstrating that simple contract features can complement data-driven credit risk models.