A new form of lending using digital collateral has recently emerged, most prominently in low and middle income countries. Digital collateral (DC) relies on ``lockout" technology, which allows the lender to temporarily disable the flow value of the collateral to the borrower without physically repossessing it. We explore the effect of this new form of credit both in a model and in a field experiment [Slides]
Standard models assume that transactions are executed once the buyer and seller agree on a price. In practice, there is usually a period of ``due diligence" after terms have been negotiated but prior to execution. We analyze such a model. We show that the acquirer engages in “too much” due diligence relative to the social optimum. Nevertheless, allowing for due diligence can improve both total surplus and the seller’s payoff compared to a setting with no due diligence. [Slides]
(with Dong Wei)
Price discrimination and information discrimination are compliments; allowing for one activates a role for the other. The optimal mechanism features both. [Slides]
With credit ratings, privately informed issuers opt for more information sensitive securities such as levered equity.