Professor of Finance | Olin Business School | Washington University in St. Louis

Working Papers

with Cyrus Mevorach and Curtis Taylor
R&R at The Review of Economic Studies
Abstract
We study consumer stockpiling, monopoly pricing, and inventory choice during supply disruptions. Consumer stockpiling may reduce firm profits and consumer welfare. We show that strategic reserves can restore optimality by mitigating the distortions caused by supply uncertainty. [SSRN] [Slides]
with Paul Gertler, Renping Li, and David Sraer
R&R at The Review of Economic Studies
Abstract
We study PAYGo financing for smartphones and other consumer durables in developing countries. Using a dynamic structural model estimated from a fintech pricing experiment, we show that technology-enabled lending generates significant welfare gains equivalent to a substantial income increase, while remaining profitable for lenders. [SSRN] [Slides]
with Paul Gertler and Catherine Wolfram
Conditionally Accepted at AER: Insights
Abstract
We study a cash loan contract that requires borrowers to make a cash deposit prior to disbursement. The deposit is credited toward the loan principal at disbursement and does not alter repayment incentives. In a randomized controlled trial, we find that the deposit requirement reduces loan take-up but selects borrowers who repay substantially better, raising lender profits. The deposit screens borrowers on both observable and latent characteristics: high-risk borrowers are less likely to take deposit loans and, controlling for all observables, deposit-loan takers repay at a higher rate, particularly among low-risk borrowers. [SSRN]
with Alexander S. Gorbenko and Shreye Mirani
Abstract
We study non-price deal terms in merger contests. Using a hand-collected dataset of U.S. mergers, we show that non-price terms are pervasive, differ systematically by bidder type, and often determine the winner. Our structural model reveals that these terms carry substantial economic value for targets. [Draft]
with Felix Z. Feng, Curtis R. Taylor, and Mark Westerfield
Abstract
We study the optimal organizational structure for innovation over time, analyzing complementary R&D tasks with moral hazard and privately observed discovery quality. We characterize when a solo innovator is optimal versus a team structure and how the optimal allocation shifts over the project lifecycle. [Draft]